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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14578

JOSEPH ANSELMO,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Joseph Anselmo, appeals from
a judgment of conviction and sentence thereon entered
against him in the Third Judicial District Court for the
crimes of kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant Joseph Anselmo was convicted by a jury
of the crimes of kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault on
April 1, 1976, after a two-day trial.

Sentence of the court
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was pronounced on April 1, 1976, ordering Appellant to
serve the indeterminant term as provided by law of
years for kidnapping and five

o

to 5

years to life for aggravated

sexual assault, the terms to run concurrently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Joseph Anselmo seeks reversal of
the court below as to the judgment entered on the conviction of aggravated sexual assault.

Appellant does not

appeal from his conviction for the crime of kidnapping.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 20, 1975, Laura Margaret Lund
received a phone call from a past acquaintance and went
to meet her at a Salt Lake City restaurant.
31)

(Tr. 29-

Laura Margaret Lund met several people for the first

time that night including Appellant Joseph Anselmo at his
apartment on Fourth South in Salt Lake City.

(Tr. 35)

She testified that she talked with Appellant and he wanted
her to be his "old lady" and she said she was not interested
in such a proposition but that she would go to a party that
night at a friend's house just as a friend.

(Tr. 38,39)
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She testified that after arriving at the home
of "J.T."

(Martin Hayes) approximately eight people were

there engaging in drinking and listening to music.

(Tr. 40-

44)
Shortly thereafter Laura Margaret Lund testified
that Anselmo took her to a side bedroom in the home and
tried to kiss her and make other advances.

There was a

conversation about Laura Margaret Lund having said she
wanted to go to the party as a friend only and then appellant
said he had changed his mind about that.

(Tr. 48)

Laura

Margaret Lund testified that she yelled that she wanted
to leave and Anselmo hit her in the face with his fist
and said she could not leave and she was to be his "old
lady".

(Tr. 50,51)
Laura Margaret Lund testified that after being

hit by Appellant Anselmo her eyes were blackened and her
face swollen.

(Tr. 60, Exhibit 15, 16)

After being struck Laura Margaret Lund went
to another room and shortly thereafter Appellant Anselmo
came in and hit her with his fist again in the face and took
her to the side room.

(Tr. 52,53)

In the side bedroom

again a struggle ensued with Appellant Anselmo trying to
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remove Laura Margaret Lund's clothing and she struggling
to free herself.

(Tr. 54,55)

At that point Laura Margaret

Lund testified that defendant got on his knees.above her
and held one hand at her throat and pulled his other fist
back but said nothing.

(Tr. 58)

At that point she testi-

fied that she did not want to get hurt and she submitted
to an act of sexual intercourse with appellant.

(Tr. 58)

She slept in that room that night with appellant
and the next day, November 21, Friday, she testified that
she was taken to a back room by appellant and one Martin
Hayes where she again testified that she was raped, after
appellant said to her that she had better settle down or
he would see that his man would take care of her.
65)

(Tr. 64,

When asked what he meant, Martin Hayes hit the wall

with a hanuner and said "That's what he means".
Laura Margaret Lund testified that she remained
in the home until Monday evening, November 24, 1975.

(Tr. 74)

She testified that she sneaked out Monday evening and spoke
with police officers two days later on November 26.
The complaining witness was examined by a
physician on November 25 and he, Dr. George Hinckley,
testified that she had bruises and abrasions about her
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eyes (Tr. 126), but he could neither confirm nor deny an
act of intercourse due to various factors.

(Tr. 129, 131)

At the end of the State's case, appellant moved
to reduce Count

I I of the information,

charging

aggravated

sexual assault, to simple rape on the grounds that the State
had not proved the necessary threats had been made to
prove aggravated sexual assault, but that the matter should
go to the jury only on the lesser included offense of simple
rape.

(Tr. 135-139)

The motion was denied by the court.

(Tr. 142)
Appellant Anselmo did not deny any acts of
intercourse with Laura Margaret Lund but testified that
his having hit her was over an argument concerning something
other than whether she would submit to sex and he testified
that he did not force her to commit any sex act.

(Tr. 184-

186)
The jury returned verdicts of simple kidnapping,
a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping as
charged in the information, and guilty of aggravated sexual
assault as charged in Count

I I of the information.

R. 491,412)

-5-
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(Tr. 220,

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE COUNT
II OF THE INFORMATION AT THE END OF
THE STATE'S CASE FROM THE CHARGE OF
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT AS CONTAINED
IN THE INFORMATION TO THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SIMPLE RAPE BECAUSE
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE NECESSARY
ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT.
Under our recent criminal code rape is defined
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-402 as an act of
sexual intercourse with a female not the actor's wife,
without her consent.

"Without her consent" is defined

in Section 76-5-406 in several ways, the only ones which
have relevance in this case being subsection 1 or subsection
2.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-55-406 says an act of

sexual intercourse is without consent when the actor compels
the victim to submit or particpate by any threat that would
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.
so, if a person threatens another so as to overcome resistance
in a person of ordinary resolution, any following act of
sexual intercourse is without consent and if the victim is

-6-
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not the wife of the perpetrator, it is an act of rape.
For an act of rape to rise to a first degree
felony under Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault, the actor, in the course of a rape,
must either cause serious bodily injury or compel the submission to the rape by a "threat of kidnapping, death, or
serious bodily injury to be inflicted iminently."

That is,

a threat must be one of kidnap, death, or serious bodily
injury (defined in 76-1-601 as "bodily injury that creates
or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss
or

~pairment

of the function of any bodily member or organ

or creates a substantial risk of death) to be taken out of
the general category of threats [76-5-406 sub(2)J so as
to negate consent and to rise to the level of a threat
that is over and above that necessary to amount to a threat
compelling submission to the rape and thus be an aggravated
sexual assault.
Threats that overcome the resistance of aperson
of ordinary resolution, when used to accomplish sexual
intercourse, can get one convicted or rape.

Our legislature

then indicated that to be convicted of the more serious

-7-
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offense of aggravated sexual assault, a first degree
felony, the threats that compel submission to the rape must
be specific and not of a general type that would overcome
the resistance of a person of ordinary resolution.

That is,

a specific threat of kidnapping, death, or serious bodily
injury must be made.

Clearly our legislature had in mind

that in order to convict one of the more serious offense
of aggravated sexual assault, a more serious threat than
one that overcomes resistance of a person of ordinary
resolution must be made.
In this case there was no evidence of a specific
threat to kidnap Laura Margaret Lund, cause her death, or
to inflict serious bodily injury upon her immediately.
Laura Margaret Lund testified that she had been
hit in the face by appellant with his fists and later that
same night appellant pulled back his fist as if to hit her
while holding her with the other hand.

(Tr. 58)

That is

clearly a threat, one that may well overcome the resistance
of a person of ordinary resolution and thus any following
act would be without her consent.

However, appellant

contends that it is clearly not a threat of kidnapping or

-8-
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death.

As the term "serious bodily injury" is defined it

is also equally clearly not a threat of iminent serious
bodily injury; that is, permanent disfigurement or a
substantial risk of death.

This becomes clear when compar-

ing Utah Code Annotated, 76-5-405

(2) with 76-5-405, the

aggravated sexual assault statute.

What the aggravated

sexual assault statute has in mind in terms of threats
is serious threats with weapons of a very violent potential,
not threats to inflict injury by hand.

Any threat of

violance by bare hand would probably qualify as a threat
within 76-5-406(2), one that overcomes resistance, but the
aggravated sexual assault statute must mean some conduct
that is more severe than a threat to do injury by bare hand.
Bodily injury is

defined in 76-1-601 as physical pain

or injury and the legislature could have put that term in
sub-paragraphs (a) (ii) of 76-5-405 but it shows a term
instead

that includes within its definition an injury that

could have a substantial risk of death.

Appellant contends

that a threat under the aggravated sexual assault statute
must be much more severe than one that was shown in this
case, that is, a threat to hit someone in the face with a

-9-
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bare hand.
To contend otherwise would be to contend there
is no such thing as simple rape, because whenever an act of
sexual intercourse occurred with a female not the wife
of the actor and any kind of threat occurred, that would
amount to aggravated sexual assault if the term "threat"
within 76-5-405(a) (ii) is extended to mean a threat to do
something with one's bare hands.
As such, the State failed to prove a threat
within the aggravated sexual assault statute but instead
only proved a threat which would fit within 76-5-406 (2)
and so appellant should not have had the jury consider his
guilt on the charge of aggravated sexual assault but instead
only on the lesser included offense of rape.
Of course, aggravated sexual assault can occur
when in the course of the rape the actor causes serious
bodily injury to the victim.

As discussed above, appellant

contends that the defined term "serious bodily injury"
requires much more severe injury than was evidenced in this
case.

In this case Laura Margaret Lund suffered black eyes

and a bruise behind her left ear.
16).

(Tr. 60, 126, Exhibit 15,

The term "bodily injury" covers that sort of injury
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and the tenn serious bodily injury is reserved for those
injuries which create a substantial risk of death.

There-

fore, the State having failed to show that Appellant Anselmo
caused serious bodily injury or compelled submission to an
act of sexual intercourse by threat of kidnapping, death,
or serious bodily injury to be inflicted iminently, the
case should not have gone to the jury on that charge and
the court below erred in so allowing the jury to consider
the charge of aggravated sexual assault and so appellant is
entitled to a reversal of his conviction as to Count II of
the infonnation.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED INFAILING TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION
DEALING WITH THE AMOUNT AND NATURE OF
RESISTANCE REQUIRED IN A RAPE CASE.
In as much as Laura Margaret Lund testified
that her only actual physical resistance consisted of some
"struggling" (Tr. 57), appellant requested an instruction
on the necessity of resistance on the part of the prosecutrix.
(R. 473)

That instruction requested was as follows:

-11-
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You are instructed that the woman
must resist the force of violence
or threats of immediate or serious
bodily harm directed at her to the
extent that seems reasonable under
the circumstances. Mere passive
resistance is not sufficient. Resistance must be by acts and not by
mere words.
If a woman objects
verbally to the act of intercourse,
but by her conduct consents to it,
the element of lack of consent has
not been shown beyond a reasonable
doubt and you must acquit the defendant. Fu~ther, if her opposition appears
after a period of apparent consentual
behavior, that opposition to amount
to resistance sufficient to constitute
the lack of consent element of the offense,
must be such that a reasonable man
under the circumstances would have no
question but that consent was being
withheld. If you do not find such
resistance beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must acquit.
The court failed to give Appellant Anselmo's
proposed instruction No. 10 and he duly objected.

(Tr. 218)

In State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168 (1949) this
court reversed a conviction for rape where the jury during
deliberations returned with a question concerning a similar
instruction as proffered in appellant's case.

In that case

the pertinant portion of the instruction given by the trial
court and approved by this court was as follows:

-12-
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J

.••. that said Pearle
resisted
the said act of sexual intercourse, but
her resistance was overcome by force or
violence exerted by said defendant.
You are instructed that the word
resistance as used in these instructions, does not require that the said
Pearle
should have made the
uttermost resistance. The law requires
that the woman do what her age, strength,
the surrounding facts and all attending
circumstances make it reasonable for
her to do in order to manifest opposition
to the act of sexual intercourse. Any
objections in words, or such objections
coupled with some resistance are not
enough to make the acts of the accused
or either of them constitute rape.
The
resistance required by the law is such
resistance as the said Pearle
was capable of making at the time and
under the circumstances there existing.
Appellant Anselmo contends that in this case where
there was clearly at least a battery conunitted by Appellant
Anselmo upon Laura Margaret Lund but nowhere in the record
is any real resistance shown by her except verbally that
the proffered instruction was necessary to inform the jury
that earnest resistance was required.
The court defined aggravated sexual assault in
Instruction 23 (R. 437) and the crime of rape in Instruction 24
(R. 438)

In order to determine the meaning of those terms

-13-
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the jury was of course required to refer to the definition
"without consent" in Instruction No. 25 (R. 439).

In

Instruction No. 25 the court told the jury that an act of
sexual intercourse is without consent of the victim when,
among other things, the actor compels the victim to submit
or participate by force that overcomes such earnest resistance as might reasonably be expected under the circumstances.
That sub-paragraph is of course taken from the definition
in U.C.A. 76-5-406 (1).

In Instruction 26 (R. 440) the

court attempted to discuss what amount of resistance is
required.

However, under the facts of this case where the

slight resistance offered was merely verbal an instruction
such as that approved in State v. Beeny, supra, is more
appropriate than the court's Instruction No. 26. (R. 440)
Such instruction as the court gave would be appropriate
where there was testimony that there was physical resistance
overcome by force but Laura Margaret Lund nowhere in her
testimony indicated that she physically resisted.

As such

the court committed error which affected the substantial
rights or Appellant Anselmo requiring a reversal of his
conviction for aggravated sexual assault.

-14-
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POINT III
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GIVING AN
INSTRUCTION UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WHICH TENDED TO CONFUSE
THE JURY.
The court in Instruction No. 25 (R. 439) defined
the term "without consent" in three sub-paragraphs, the
first two of which did have applicability to the facts of
this case.
Paragraph 3 stated "the victim has not consented
and the actor knows that the victim is unconscious, unaware
that the act is occurring, or physically unable to resist."
That subsection is taken from 76-5-406(3) as one of the
possible ways in which an act of sexual intercourse can be
without the consent of the victim.

However, in this case,

there was absolutely no evidence that the victim was
unconscious or unaware of what was occurring or physically
unable to resist.
It is clear that a court is not to give instructions on abstract principles of law not supported by the
evidence.

See, for example, State v. Chealey, 100 U 423,

116 P.2d 377 (1941); State v. Rivenburg 11 U.2d 95, 355 P.2d
639 (1960).

In State v. Thompson, 110

u.

113, 170 P.2d
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153 (1946), this court stated the rule above and went on to
say, 170 P.2d 162:
[the court is notJ to instruct on any
question which is not involved the
case under the evidence. We think
that it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the court should apply the
law to the facts as they appear from
the evidence, and should instruct only
on the law which has a bearing on the
facts.
Appellant contends that Instruction No. 25
which was objected to by appellant (Tr. 219) should not
have been

given because there was no evidence to support

that portion of the instruction.

An instruction which has

no support on the record, even though it may be a correct
statement of an abstract proposition of law, is improper
when there is no support for it in the evidence

and

it is

grounds for reversal if it is calculated to mislead the
jury.

People v. Moore, 43 Cal. 2d 513, 275 P.2d 485 (1954).

Appellant Anselmo contends that in light of the circumstances
of this case the giving of this portion of the instruction
misled the jury and was prejudicial and reversable error.
The last phrase of sub-paragraph 3 in Instruction

-16-
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No. 25, "or physically unable to resist" clearly has in
mind the situation related to the first phrases of that
paragraph.

That is, when a victim is unable to move or

unconscious or under the influence of drugs or in some
manner unaware of what is occurring after having been
knocked

unconscious or for some other reason totally

physically unable to resist such an instruction would be
appropriate.

However, in this case, the jury could have

easily been misled to believe that Laura Margaret Lund was
physically unable to resist because she had been hit in the
face by Appellant Anselmo.

In State v. Pacheco, 27 U.2d

45, 492 P.2d 1347 (1972), this court reversed a conviction
for grand larceny and gave the defendant a new trial
saying that it was impossible for this court to "Prestidigitate whether the jury convicted defendant of larceny
or aiding and abetting, under the record in this case".
So also in this case this court cannot say whether the
jury found either that Laura Margaret Lund submitted
because her resistance was overcome by force or whether she
sumbitted to sexual intercourse because of threats or whether
the jury mistakenly believed that she was physically unable
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to resist as that term was set forth in Instruction No. 25.
There was simply no evidence to support the giving of that
portion of Instruction No. 25 and it is impossible for this
court to say that the jury did not rely on that portion of
the instruction and for the reasons advanced in Pacheco,
supra, Appellant Anselmo is entitled to a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the court
erred in submitting the case to the jury on the offense
of aggravated sexual assault as charged in Count II of the
information, and erred in the giving of certain instructions,
appellant respectfully submits that the case should be
remanded for a new trial as to the judgment entered on
Count II of the information.
Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE C. LUBECK
Attorney for Appellant
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